HIGHETH sent to an arbitrary, user-controlled address
HIGHPotential reentrancy (manual review required)
MEDIUMStrict equality on balances/tokens
MEDIUMStrict equality on balances/tokens
MEDIUMStrict equality on balances/tokens
MEDIUMReturn value of an external call ignored
MEDIUMContract should inherit an interface it claims to implement
MEDIUMCentralization risk (absolute admin powers)
MEDIUMCentralization risk (absolute admin powers)
MEDIUMCentralization risk (absolute admin powers)
MEDIUMCentralization risk (absolute admin powers)
MEDIUMCentralization risk (absolute admin powers)
MEDIUMCentralization risk (absolute admin powers)
MEDIUMCentralization risk (absolute admin powers)
MEDIUMCentralization risk (absolute admin powers)
MEDIUMtransfer()/transferFrom() return value not checked
MEDIUMtransfer()/transferFrom() return value not checked
MEDIUMtransfer()/transferFrom() return value not checked
MEDIUMtransfer()/transferFrom() return value not checked
LOWReentrancy without state impact (benign)
LOWReentrancy without state impact (benign)
LOWReentrancy without state impact (benign)
LOWblock.timestamp dependence
LOWblock.timestamp dependence
LOWblock.timestamp dependence
LOWblock.timestamp dependence
LOWMissing zero-address check
INFORMATIONALReentrancy detected via event emission order
Preview only — no exploit details or fix recommendations are published here
to avoid disclosing an unpatched issue before the contract owner sees it. Full report (RU+EN), exact lines,
exploit path and fork PoC — via the bot below.
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Auto-audit by SecurityLab (slither+aderyn). Static analysis only unless noted as PoC-confirmed —
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