CRITICALETH sent to an arbitrary, user-controlled address
MEDIUMStrict equality on balances/tokens
MEDIUMStrict equality on balances/tokens
MEDIUMLocal variable used before initialization
MEDIUMLocal variable shadows a state variable
MEDIUMLow-level call return value not checked
MEDIUMLow-level call return value not checked
MEDIUMContract can receive ETH but has no withdrawal path
MEDIUMContract can receive ETH but has no withdrawal path
MEDIUMContract can receive ETH but has no withdrawal path
MEDIUMContract can receive ETH but has no withdrawal path
MEDIUMContract can receive ETH but has no withdrawal path
MEDIUMtransfer()/transferFrom() return value not checked
MEDIUMtransfer()/transferFrom() return value not checked
MEDIUMtransfer()/transferFrom() return value not checked
MEDIUMtransfer()/transferFrom() return value not checked
MEDIUMtransfer()/transferFrom() return value not checked
MEDIUMtransfer()/transferFrom() return value not checked
MEDIUMtransfer()/transferFrom() return value not checked
LOWReentrancy without state impact (benign)
LOWReentrancy without state impact (benign)
LOWblock.timestamp dependence
LOWblock.timestamp dependence
LOWUnbounded loop over dynamic array
LOWAddress parameter not indexed in event
LOWAddress parameter not indexed in event
LOWAddress parameter not indexed in event
LOWAddress parameter not indexed in event
LOWAddress parameter not indexed in event
LOWAddress parameter not indexed in event
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Auto-audit by SecurityLab (slither+aderyn). Static analysis only unless noted as PoC-confirmed —
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