CRITICALETH sent to an arbitrary, user-controlled address
CRITICALReentrancy in ETH withdrawal
MEDIUMReentrancy: balance updated after external call
MEDIUMReentrancy: balance updated after external call
MEDIUMReentrancy: balance updated after external call
MEDIUMReentrancy: balance updated after external call
MEDIUMReentrancy: balance updated after external call
MEDIUMReentrancy: balance updated after external call
MEDIUMReentrancy: balance updated after external call
MEDIUMReentrancy: balance updated after external call
MEDIUMDivision before multiplication (precision loss)
MEDIUMStrict equality on balances/tokens
MEDIUMStrict equality on balances/tokens
MEDIUMStrict equality on balances/tokens
MEDIUMStrict equality on balances/tokens
MEDIUMStrict equality on balances/tokens
MEDIUMStrict equality on balances/tokens
MEDIUMStrict equality on balances/tokens
MEDIUMReturn value of an external call ignored
MEDIUMReturn value of an external call ignored
MEDIUMReturn value of an external call ignored
MEDIUMReturn value of an external call ignored
MEDIUMtransfer()/transferFrom() return value not checked
MEDIUMtransfer()/transferFrom() return value not checked
MEDIUMtransfer()/transferFrom() return value not checked
MEDIUMtransfer()/transferFrom() return value not checked
MEDIUMtransfer()/transferFrom() return value not checked
LOWReentrancy without state impact (benign)
LOWblock.timestamp dependence
INFORMATIONALLow-level call usage
Preview only — no exploit details or fix recommendations are published here
to avoid disclosing an unpatched issue before the contract owner sees it. Full report (RU+EN), exact lines,
exploit path and fork PoC — via the bot below.
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Auto-audit by SecurityLab (slither+aderyn). Static analysis only unless noted as PoC-confirmed —
not a substitute for a manual audit before mainnet deployment with real funds.